American economic resilience, imperialist aggression and class polarisation have far-reaching implications for socialist perspectives in the US and elsewhere. In this guest piece for the anti-empire notes newsletter, G. Stewart, a New York-based socialist journalist and activist, examines the dynamics of US domestic economic expansion since the pandemic. A second contribution will analyse the US in the world economy in the context of Washington’s imperialist aggression and its rivalry with Beijing. A third instalment will explore the state of the US working class, organised labour and the social movements.

The US economy is undergoing its biggest ever capital investment boom, driven by government industrial policies, corporate tax cuts and AI data centre spending. Profits as a share of the economy are at their highest in 80 years. The stock market routinely smashes records, and the unemployment rate remains near historic lows.

Such economic upswings normally spell political success for a US president. But Donald Trump’s poll numbers are miserable, not only because of outrage over his reactionary policies but also because of working-class frustration about the cost of living and worries about AI-driven job losses. What’s more, the unpopular US war on Iran and its global energy disruption, along with the trade war with China and other countries, have affected the US, driving up inflation. Meanwhile, the gains of the economic expansion have gone overwhelmingly to the wealthy—the richest 10 percent of the population now account for more than half of all consumer spending. The top 0.1 percent hold roughly $22.5 trillion—about 13 percent of total household wealth and around 5.5 times the wealth of the bottom 50 percent combined.

When the boom ends, corporate debt amassed in the murky private credit market—estimated at up to $2 trillion—could worsen any subsequent recession. At the time of writing, however, the US economy is powering ahead. To understand why, it’s helpful to look at the turn towards economic nationalism and economic stimulus initiated in Donald Trump’s first term (2017-21) and embraced by Joe Biden’s administration (2021-25). Whatever their political differences, Trump and Biden reflected an emerging policy consensus that a trade war with China was inevitable and necessary to revive US industry, that Washington should prioritise military might alongside tariffs and that economic stimulus is key to reviving the US economy.

The excruciatingly slow recovery from the Great Recession (2008-09) enabled Trump to tap working-class discontent as he eked out a victory in the 2016 election. His $5.5 trillion in tax cuts favoured corporations and the wealthy but failed to deliver the promised boost to economic growth. In part, that was because companies used their tax breaks on share buybacks to benefit investors. At the same time, Trump levied tariffs on China, with the promise of rebuilding heavy industry, but the trade war fizzled and manufacturing job losses continued.

On the eve of the pandemic in early 2020, the economy was growing at a respectable 2.3 percent; the unemployment rate of 3.5 percent was a 50-year low. When the pandemic produced one of the fastest and deepest recessions in US history, Trump and the Congress pushed through the CARES Act, injecting $2.2 trillion into the economy and preventing a collapse. Unemployment peaked at 14.8 percent in April 2020, the highest level since the Great Depression, but had been pushed down to 6.7 percent by the time of Biden’s election victory in November 2020.

Next came a series of stimulus packages: post-election Covid relief spending of $900 billion in the December 2020 budget, followed by a series of measures by the Biden administration. The American Rescue Plan Act of early 2021 injected $1.8 trillion into the economy, and was credited by Wall Street analyst firm Moody’s with avoiding a second recession. Profit rates as measured by the US government hit their highest since 1950.

More big spending followed: the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act in 2021 and, in the following year, the $52.7 billion tech-focused CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, which included $500 billion in new spending and tax breaks with a climate change and infrastructure focus. The result was the biggest fixed capital formation in the US in decades as manufacturing construction soared. A writer for the Brookings Institution, a think tank …